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INTRODUCTION
In the twenty-one years since Bruner and Postman (1947)
coined the term "perceptual defense" to account for the re
lationship between stimulus emotionality (the amount of affect
or emotionality associated with the stimulus) and the diffi
culty in recognizing such stimuli, hundreds of studies have
been done in an attempt to determine what factors are relevant
to the perceptual defense phenomenon.

In general, the findings

have been that the recognition threshold for emotional stimuli
differs from that for neutral stimuli, depending upon the per
sonality of the subject and the degree of emotionality assoc
iated with the stimulus— the main idea being that there is
some actual change in the perceptual system.

Perceptual de

fense is said to occur when the recognition threshold for
emotional stimuli is higher than that for neutral stimuli.
The opposite trend is known as "perceptual vigilance" or
"perceptual sensitization."
Because there has been a great deal of controversy as
to whether there really is a phenomenon of perceptual defense,
Erfksen (1954) pointed out three variables that must be con
trolled in studying perceptual defense;

1) the emotionality

associated with the stimulus, 2) stimulus familiarity, and
3) response inhibition.

In any study it must be demonstrated

that the emotionality associated with the experimental or
'emotional' stimulus actually differs from that associated
\vith the control or 'neutral' stimulus.

It must also be

demonstrated that any perceptual defense effect is not due
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to differential familiarity with the experimental and control
stimuli nor due to subjects' tendency to inhibit certain re
sponses.

Perceptual defense studies in the past have failed

to control these three variables adequately.
A fourth variable which has been ignored by most research
ers in the area of perceptual defense was identified by Blum
in a series of studies (Blum, 1954, 1955, 1957) and has been
discussed briefly in a few review articles (Brown, 1961; Eriksen,
1960; Minard,

1965; Natsoulas, 1965; Nelson, 1955; Smock, 1956).

This is the "stimulus effect hypothesis" (Natsoulas, 1965).
It suggests that one may recognize neutral and emotional stimuli
equally well but respond to them differently— that the perception
of some aspect of the emotional stimulus may trigger an avoidance
reaction in the subject which results in the inhibition of
emotional responses.

The purpose of this paper, then, was to

determine the most effective ways of controlling the three
variables discussed by Eriksen (1954) and to incorporate them
in a study which was designed to evaluate the stimulus-effect
hypothesis.

Definitions:
Emotional Stimuli (ES)... stimuli conveying enough affective
meaning to elicit behavior indicating emotional arousal.
Neutral Stimuli (NS)... stimuli which do not convey enough
affective meaning to elicit behavior indicating emotional
arousal.
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Perceptual Defense (PD)...the tendency to perceive a neutral
stimulus more easily than an emotional stimulus.
Emotional Response...a response which acknowledges the presence
of an emotional stimulus.
Neutral Response...a response which acknowledges the presence
of a neutral stimulus.
Ert...the tendency to suppress emotional responses when the
stimulus is emotional.
Nrt...the tendency to suppress emotional responses when the
stimulus is neutral.

Control
of Stimulus
Emotionality:
1
. ". 11
;1
\ • V\'
*1
As Eriksen (1954) and Brown (1961) have pointed out, in
many PD studies the emotionality associated with the discriminable stimuli has simply been taken for granted.

In some

cases the experimental design was such as to make it very
probable that the emotionality associated with the experimental
stimuli was greater than that associated with the control stim
uli®

Brown & Yandell (1966), for instance, made half of their

subjects feel that they had done poorly on a task and the
other half feel as though they had done well.

They then pre

sented the subjects success, failure and neutral words, assuming
that the failure words would be more emotional for the subjects
who felt that they had done poorly on the task.

Bootzin &

Stephens (1967), and Caron & Wallach (1959) assumed the same
I

thing when they induced the feeling of failure in their subjects
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and had specific stimuli related to this failure.

In similar

studies it was assumed that the failure associated with failed
anagram words gave these words negative affect making them
suitable ES in the PD study (Eriksen & Browne,

1956; Postman

& Solomon, 1950; Spence, 1957).
In a brief pilot study, however, the present writer found
that there were no consistent changes in the affect associated
with failed anagram words as indicated by changes in semantic
differential responses for these words.

When questioned about

this subjects commonly said that the anagram problems were fun
and that they didn't have the feeling of failure associated
with them.

In these cases mentioned above it seems that Eriksen

and Brown's demand for a demonstration of differential emotion
ality between experimental and control stimuli is appropriate.
In a number of studies stimuli which were generally
accepted as emotional were used as the experimental stimuli.
Loiselle (1966) and Loiselle & Williamson (1966), for instance,
assumed that certain photographs were more emotion provoking
than others ie. nudes^vs. scenery; and Lazarus, Eriksen, and
Fonda (1951) assumed sexual and aggressive material to be
emotionally threatening to certain types of subjects.
no attempt was made to validate these assumptions.

However,

Bryant,

Turner, and Lair (1967) and Nothman (1962) used "taboo” words
as their ES without attempting to validate their emotional
value.

It may well be that these kinds of stimuli are emotional

for the majority of subjects due to the feelings of anxiety
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or embarrassment or tension, etc. associated with them; but
as Brown and Eriksen pointed out, the emotionality associated
with each stimulus should be determined for each individual
subject.
When words are used as ES and NS, one of the most common
ways of determining stimulus emotionality has been by a word
association test as suggested by Bootzin & Natsoulas (1965),
Brown (1961), Goldstein (1962, 1964 & 1966), and Mathews &
Wertheimer (1958).

The procedure is to tell the subject that

he is going to be presented a list of words and that he is to
respond to each word with the first word that enters his mind.
The test words are then read to the subject, one at a time,
and the subject's response time for each word is recorded.
The list is then repeated with the subject instructed to give
the same response to each word.

According to Jungian theory,

the degree of emotionality associated with each word, as indi
cated by a number of autonomic changes, is directly correlated
with the latency of the response and failure to give the same
response on the second presentation. (Jung, 1918).

Therefore

the emotional words are indicated by longer response latencies
and repetition failures while neutral words have shorter response
latencies and correctly recalled responses.
E. M. Coles (1965) has denied the validity of studies
which use this measure of emotionality on the ground that the
word association test has not been demonstrated to be a valid
indicator of stimulus emotionality.

In his reply to this,
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Brown (1965b) had to agree that there is inadequate evidence
underlying the assumptions of the word association test and
that it is very sensitive to other variables as well as to
stimulus emotionality.

It has been demonstrated, in fact,

that the word association test is a better indicator of stim
ulus familiarity and of associative strength than an indicator
of stimulus emotionality (Brown, 1965a; Freeborg, 1967; Levlnger
& Clark, 1961).
As psychological events are often reflected in a number
of different physiological reactions to stimulation, a more
promising approach to the identification of emotional material
might employ the measurement of certain physiological activ
ities.

According to Runquist & Ross (1959):

There are a number of so-called physiological responses
such as GSR, pulse rate, respiration rate, skin temper
ature, etc., which frequently have been used to define
emotionality. The hypothesis may thus be formulated
that the magnitude of these responses is some increasing
function of the intensity of the hypothetical emotional
response (p.329).
One problem with such a global statement, however, is that
the symptoms of emotionality are specific to each indi
vidual. That is, not all physiological systems are acti
vated by stress or noxious stimulation, but there are
individual differences not only in intensity of the emo
tional response but also in the particular autonomic
channel through which it discharges (Runquist & Spence,
1959, p.417).
This was also concluded from the findings of several other
researchers (Jost & Sontag, 1944; Lacey, Bateman & VanLehn,
1953; Wenger, 1941).

Another problem, as pointed out by Davis,

Buchwald & Frankmann (1955), is that the patterns of different

responses through the autonomic nervous system change with
repeated stimulation.

That is, some autonomic responses get

larger with repeated stimulation while other responses - in
cluding the GSR - show an extinction or habituation effect
and gradually disappear.
In spite of the problems of individual differences and
the habituation effect, Montague & Coles (1966) still suggest
that "the galvanic skin response (GSR) is the most sensitive
physiological indicator of psychological events available to
the psychologist (p. 261)."

It is elicited by a wide variety

of motor responses such as coughing, laughing, flexing a
muscle, making a quick movement, etc.; and it is easily elic
ited by sudden changes in external stimuli as when the subject
is startled by an electric shock, bright light or loud tone.
As emphasized by Flanagan (1967), the GSR is readily elicited
by all the "accidental variables that are relevant to attention
(ie. novelty, suddenness, expectancy, etc. (p. 8)."

At the

same time, however, the GSR is also very responsive to emo
tional changes and is widely accepted as a measure of emotion
ality.
Dittes (1957a), for instance, reviewed a case history
of psychotherapy with one patient and concluded that as therapy
progressed the patient's feelings of fear and embarrassment
in the interpersonal relationship gradually extinguished as
indicated by a progressive decrease and disappearance of the
patient's GSRs.

In another review Dittes (1957b) interpreted
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the GSR as "a measure of the anxiety of the patient, or his
"mobilization" against any cue threatening punishment by the
therapist (p. 303)," and showed that the patient's GSR was
inversely related to the judged permissiveness of the therapist.
This inverse relationship between inferred anxiety and ther
apist permissiveness was somewhat obscured by the fact that
the GSRs were also related to the emotional significance of
the patient's speech.
Reyher & Smeltzer (1968) assumed that the GSR measured
the emotionality associated with responses when they concluded
that visual imagery is accompanied by more anxiety than is
verbal association because imagining the stimulus word elic
ited greater GSRs than associating to it.

Similarly, Craig &

Weinstein (1965) using the GSR as "a physiological measure of
affect arousal," concluded that observing a model get shocked
for repeated failures on a perceptual-motor task was more
emotional than observing success on the task.

This followed

from the finding that subjects observing repeated failures
gave larger GSRs than subjects observing success.
In a series of studies (Runquist & Ross, 1958, 1959;
Runquist & Spence, 1959) the GSR and pulse rate changes were
assumed to be indicators of "emotional responsiveness to weak
f

noxious stimulation (Runquist & R o s s ,

1959, p.330)."

These

measures were used to classify subjects as emotional or nonemotional in an attempt to evaluate the relationship of high
and low levels of responsiveness to performance in eyelid
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conditioning.

The writers, however, suggested that these

physiological measures, may reflect "skeletal startle responses"
rather than true emotional responsiveness; and in this case
one should perhaps refer to the different levels of physio
logical responses as indicative of different drive levels
which in turn might be interpreted as different levels of
emotional responsiveness.
In the studies described above the assumption has been
that the GSR is a valid indicator of emotionality.

While

there is some controversy as to how valid it really is (Flan
agan, 1967; Levinger & Clark, 196.1; Runquist & Ross, 1959;
Runquist & Spence, 1959), there is considerable evidence sup
porting its use in this way.
In a classical conditioning experiment by Diven (1937),
for instance, a word was paired a number of times with shock;
and as expected, that word became the CS for the GSR.

The

affect associated with this critical word generalized to words
of related meaning which were then able to elicit a GSR also.
In a similar study Peastrel, Wishner & Kaplan (1968) showed
essentially the same thing - that the affect associated with
the critical word will generalize to synonyms or homophones
depending upon the mental set induced by the instructions.
In these studies it seems logical to infer that the GSRs are
elicited by the negative affect associated with the critical
and related words.
Forrest & Dimond (1967) analyzed the GSRs that were elic-

ited by different responses during Rorschach testing for 23
subjects and concluded that the GSR can be thought of as an
index of the subject's anxiety level.

Panek & Martin (1959)

made the same conclusion when they found a significant corre
lation between speech disturbances and GSRs during psychotherapy.
In fact, they suggested: "An index based upon both speech dis
turbance measures and occurrence of GSR dips should prove to
be a fairly reliable and valid indication of momentary changes
in anxiety level in psychotherapy interviews (p.405)."
More direct support of the GSR as a measure of emotion
ality comes from studies in desensitization therapy.

Geer

(1966), for instance, demonstrated that subjects who reported
great fear of spiders gave greater GSRs when shown pictures
of spiders than when shown pictures of snakes.

They also

gave larger GSRs to pictures of spiders than other subjects
who reported low fear of spiders.

In a similar study Wilson

(1967) demonstrated that perfect separation could be made
between high-fear and low-fear subjects on the basis of their
GSRs to ES and NS.

Clark (1963) emphasized the value of the

GSR amplifier as a means of detecting changes in emotional
states during systematic desensitization of a phobia.

In

his study the GSR was closely watched for detection of sympa
thetic activity below the threshold of subjective appreciation.
"Resistances tended to show a slight sudden drop when any
stimulus was advanced too far and this occurred several times
well before the subject actually felt any anxiety (p.66)."
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As mentioned earlier, a number of researchers have simply
assumed that taboo words are more emotional than neutral words.
Dixon (1958) demonstrated that this was true by showing that
"all seven S's gave higher average GSRs for emotional items
than they did for neutral ones (p.31)."

This was especially

revealing, for the stimuli were presented at a level of bright
ness below the absolute threshold, and no subject reported
having seen any of them.

It seems doubtful, therefore, that

the GSRs would have been due to the attention variables of
novelty, suddenness, expectancy, etc. referred to by Flanagan
(1967).

Zajonc (1962) found similar results when he presented

taboo and neutral words tachistoscopically and showed that on
all trials the GSRs elicited by the taboo words exceeded those
elicited by neutral words.

McCurdy (1950) reviewed a number

of studies which supported the hypothesis that there is a
significant correlation between GSRs elicited by taboo and
neutral words and the subjective judgments of emotionality
for each word.

In his own study McCurdy found this correlation

to be .76.
In a recent review of a number of such studies and fol
lowing an evaluation of the factors eliciting GSRs, Flanagan
(1967) concluded:
Present results indicate that the concept of attention
is a better intervening variable interpretation of GSR
than is the concept of emotion. Experienced GSR researchers
have repeatedly indicated this conclusion. However, those
interested in personality have continued to interpret GSR
as an index of emotion or anxiety
The distinction is
also of importance to experimental designs because the
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accidental variables that are relevant to attention (ie.
novelty, suddenness, expectancy, etc.) are typically
ignored by experimenters who regard the GSR as an index
of emotion or anxiety (p.8).
It is not the intention of the present writer to present
the GSR as the final and flawless answer to a measure of emo
tionality for PD research.

It is not, however, reasonable

to ignore its possible advantages over other methods of meas
urement simply because it is affected by a number of variables
unrelated to emotionality.

It is suggested, however, that

one can reliably use the GSR as an indicator of emotionality
by controlling the extraneous variables which can affect it
such as suddenness, novelty, expectancy, muscufar movements,
etc.

Even Flanagan (1967) and Levinger & Clark (1961), who

criticized its use in this way, agree that one thing it can
and does measure is the emotional response.
Another approach to measuring the emotionality associated
with various stimuli is simply to ask each subject how emotional
each stimulus is for him.

This has been the typical approach
$
in desensitization therapy. A patient identifies his areas
of tension, fear, etc., by indicating on a questionnaire the
degree of tension associated with various situations and ob
jects.

There are a number of studies on the validity of such

questionnaires or "fear survey schedules" as they are called
(Geer, 1965; Laynor & Manosevitz, 1966; Rubin, Katkin, Weiss
& Efran, 1968; Wolpe & Lang, 1964).

The general finding has

been that patients can and do accurately identify areas of
tension.

Additional validation of such questionnaires comes

from reports of therapy in which patients indicate reduced
anxiety associated with phobic objects foll o w i n g successful
desensitization therapy (Garlington & Cotier,
Lazovik, 1963).

1968; Lang &

And as mentioned earlier, Clark (1963), Geer

(1966), and Wilson (1967) all found that items identified as
highier in the hierarchy of feared items elicited significantly
greater GSRs than those lower in the hierarchy.

Depending

upon the confidence one has in the GSR as a measure of emo
tionality in this type of situation, this is additional support
for the validity of such introspective measures of feelings.
Zuckerman & Lubin (1964), in attempting to validate an
adjective-eheck-list type questionnaire to measure temporary
changes in moods, warned of subjects' tendencies to falsify
the report in order to give the experimenter what he is looking
for.

This is what Orne (1962) referred to when he wrote about

the "demand characteristics" of the experimental situation:
Subjects are concerned about their performance in terms
of reinforcing their self-image; nonetheless, they seem
even more concerned with the utility of their performances.
We might well expect then that as far as the subject is
able, he will behave in an experimental context in a
manner designed to play the role of a "good subject" or,
in other wor&s, to validate the experimental hypothesis
(p.778).
Rosenthal (1966) also emphasized the effect of approval seeking
behavior when he wrote:
The task the experimenter formally sets for the subject
is only one problem the subject must solve. Riecken (1962)
called attention also to the subjects' "deutero-problem,"
the problem of "doping out the experiment" so his perfor
mance can be an appropriate one, and one that will lead
to favorable evaluation (p.181).
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In addition to emphasizing the "demand characteristics”
of an experiment, these statements also point out the problem
of subjects' need to give a favorable impression.

As Azrin,

Holz & Goldiamond (1961) demonstrated, subjects enter a sit
uation with preestablished response tendencies which can inter
fere with the experimental instructions.

It may be impossible

to eliminate these tendencies altogether, and no doubt in
answering any introspective questionnaire there will be some
tendency towards social conformity and giving a good impression
of onself.

It would seem, however, that these tendencies could

be considerably reduced by removing all threat of personal
exposure or embarrassment and by stressing the necessity of
giving honest, unbiased responses.

After all, as Rosenthal

and Orne have pointed out, subjects want to be good subjects;
they want to cooperate as well as they can.

Control of Stimulus Familiarity:
The second factor that must be controlled in PD studies
is the stimulus familiarity, for the subject's familiarity
with the stimulus can contribute to differential response
tendencies.

It has been shown, for instance, that there is a

direct relationship between the frequency of the subject's
experiences with the stimulus and the tendency to respond with
it in an ambiguous situation (Taylor, Rosenfeldt & Shultz,
1961).

Goldiamond & Hawkins (1958) demonstrated this by pre

senting nonsense syllables to subjects a various number of
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times to establish different amounts of familiarity with each
stimulus.

The subjects were then told that these nonsense

syllables would be presented tachistoscopically and that they
should guess at each presentation.

Actually, however, only

hash marks were presented in the tachistoscope.

Goldiamond

found that the responses were directly correlated with the
frequency of prior experiences with the stimuli— thus showing
that one's responses are directly affected by the familiarity,
with the stimuli.
A number of approaches have been used to control the
factor of familiarity in PD studies.

A very common one has

employed novel stimuli as the discriminanda.

Bootzin & Stephans

(1967), for instance, used unique eight-sided figures as their
stimuli and made certain that the subjects' familiarity with
all of the figures was the same.

Blum (1955) used Blacky

Pictures as his discriminanda and presented them to advanced
graduate students in Psychology who had been working with them
for an extended period of time.

Thus Blum attempted to con

trol for stimulus familiarity by making sure the subjects were
all very familiar with the stimuli.

Other approaches have been

to use as discriminable stimuli such things as sketches (Law
rence & Coles, 1954), numbers (Loiselle, 1966; Loiselle &
Williamson, 1966), and nonsense syllables CPhares, 1962).
Rather than utilizing novel stimuli many PD studies have
used emotional and neutral words as the stimuli to be recog
nized; but as has been pointed out before, most of these studies
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have failed to control adequately for stimulus familiarity
(Eriksen, 1954; Brown,

1961).

One common attempt to control

this variable has been to select the experimental words from
Thorndike and L orge's Teacher's word book of 50,000 words
(Brown & Yandell, 1966; Buck & Scammon, 1966; Eriksen & Browne,
1956; Goldstein, 1962 & 1964; Goldstein, Himmelfarb & Feder,
1962; Mathews & Wertheimer, 1958; Minard, 1965; Minard, Bailey
& Wertheimer, 1965; Minard & Mooney, 1969; Nothman, 1962;
Postman & Solomon, 1950; Solomon & Howes, 1951; Spence, 1957;
Taylor et al., 1961).

In such studies the attempt has been

to select control words that appear with the same frequency
as the experimental words with which they are paired.

The

criticism directed against this has been that the frequency
of occurrence in literature is not as good an indicator of
familiarity as the subjects' own evaluation of the familiarity
of experimental words.

It was found, for instance, that there

was a statistically significant relationship between recog
nition thresholds and the evaluated familiarity— the more
familiar words having lower recognition thresholds than the
less familiar words.

This tendency was similar for the words

when familiarity was determined by the Thorndike-Lorge word
frequency; but in this case the relationship was not statistically significant, suggesting that the former method of deter
mining familiarity is superior (Bryant et al., 1967).
Controlling for the subject's familiarity with the exper
imental stimuli can be thought of in another way^-as controlling
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for mental sets which the subject will form before and during
the experiment.

When the subject, for instance, has been

exposed to the experimental stimuli just before the PD study,
this recency of experience with the stimuli will give him an
expectancy to see them and thus lower his recognition threshold
for them.

Postman & Solomon (1950), for instance, demonstrated

that experience with words in an anagram study immediately
prior to the tachistoscopic presentation of these words and
other words of equal length and frequency made it easier to
recognize the anagram words.

Very similar results were found

in a replication of this study by Eriksen & Browne (1956), and
it was concluded in each case that a mental set was established
which increased the strength of the anagram words as responses.
The controlling of mental sets is necessary in any PD
study.

They can be manipulated as in the previously mentioned

studies in which the recency of experience with certain stimuli
created an expectancy to see them; but if the experimenter
wishes to avoid mental sets, he has to be very careful in
designing his study.

In the past, one of the major problems

has been that the subject comes into the experimental situ
ation with a number of preestablished mental sets.

This has

been especially true in studies which have used taboo words
and lewd or unpleasant pictures as the ES, for most of the
subjects come into the experimental situation with a low ex
pectancy for such stimuli.
It can easily be seen that mental sets are based upon
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a number of different factors: frequency of occurrence of the
stimuli, familiarity with the stimuli, recency of exposure to
the stimuli, social acceptability of the stimuli, internal
motivational states, and experimental instructions.

Since all

of these factors can influence response tendencies, they must
be controlled in order to demonstrate the effects of emotion
ality on the perceptual system.
An alternative explanation for the effect of mental sets
has been discussed by Postman (1953), Brown (1961), and Kempler
& Wiener (1963).

Basically the idea is that mental sets yield

hypotheses as to what the stimuli will be; and the stronger
the hypothesis is, the less the amount of information that will
be needed to confirm it.

Consequently a correct mental set

would yield a lower recognition threshold while an incorrect
mental set would yield a higher one.

The claim here is that

PD is not due to any actual change in the perceptual system;
but rather it is due to a change in the amount of information
needed to recognize the stimulus.
Regardless of whether mental sets affect recognition
thresholds through changes in the response tendencies or through
changes in the amount of information needed to identify the
stimulus, it is clear that they must be controlled if PD is
to be explained in terms of changes in the perceptual system
due to the emotionality associated with the stimuli.

Control of Response Suppression:
The third factor that must be controlled in any PD study
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is the tendency to inhibit responses.

There have been a number

of attempts to disprove the existence of PD by demonstrating
that the apparent differences in recognition thresholds are
due to response suppression rather than to any perceptual
process.

One approach has been to show that the PD effect

drops out when the subject does not have to respond with an
emotion arousing response.

Nothman (1962), for instance,

presented taboo and neutral words tachistoscopically under
four different response conditions and found that the PD effect
was significantly less when the subject responded in writing
rather than orally.

He also found that the PD effect dis

appeared when a subject was required to give only a fragment
of the stimulus word instead of all of it,
Zajonc (1962) showed essentially the same thing when he
trained his subjects to respond to words with other words
which had been paired with the stimuli in a paired-associates
learning situation.

At one time the stimulus was an emotional

word, and the response was either another emotional word or
a neutral word which had been learned.

At other times the

stimulus was a neutral word while the response was either a
neutral or an emotional word.

He found that the differences

in recognition thresholds were due more to the responses that
were required than to the stimuli which were presented.
In a different approach to eliminating response suppres
sion Goldstein et al. (1962) presented pairs of words tach
istoscopically, one neutral and one emotional, and required
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the subject to say which side one of them was on.

The subject

was told what the two words were and which one to look for.
This eliminated the necessity of responding with the emotional
or neutral word, and under such circumstances no PD was found.
This seems reasonable, however, for in such a situation recog
nition of either the neutral or the emotional word would indi
cate what side the required word was on.

The effect of response

bias was demonstrated also, for it was found that there were
significant side preferences depending upon whether the word
to be recognized was emotional or neutral.

In a different

experiment the conditions were all the same except that the
stimuli were hash marks instead of the stimulus words.

The

subjects didn't know this, and they responded as they had in
the previous experiment demonstrating side preferences depend
ent upon the word that was to be recognized.
To demonstrate further the relationship between response
suppression and recognition thresholds Goldstein (1962) com
pared the pseudo-accuracy scores of a stimulus-absent group
to the accuracy scores of a stimulus-present group.

By means

of a word association test a list of four emotional and four
neutral words was selected for each subject.

Each subject

in the stimulus-present group was then given this list and
told to guess which word was presented each time from the
list.

The words were then presented tachistoscopically at

an exposure time of 50 to 100 msec, below the recognition
threshold for neutral words.

Each subject's accuracy score
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was then determined by subtracting his accuracy score for
neutral words from his accuracy score for emotional words.
Difference scores for the stimulus-absent group were determined
in the same way; but because they received hash marks instead
of the words in the tachistoscopic presentations, the accuracy
scores were based upon a predetermined random order of word
presentation.

The mean difference score for the stimulus-

absent group was not significantly different from that for the
stimulus-present group, indicating that the presence of the
stimulus words had no significant effect on the recognition
thresholds.

In addition to this, the difference scores for

the stimulus-absent group were significantly different from
zero.

This would normally have been interpreted a PD if the

stimuli had actually been presented instead of hash marks.
In a later study Goldstein (1964) found similar results
when all his subjects were tested under three conditions:
stimulus present, stimulus absent, and forced choice.

Response

bias was determined for each condition, and his hypothesis
was confirmed that the magnitude of PD was equal for stimulusabsent and stimulus-present conditions.

From Goldstein's data

it appears that the most relevant factor in PD studies is the
response that is required rather than the emotionality of the
stimulus— suggesting that PD, as it is here defined, doesn't
really exist.
There have been a number of attempts to determine the
effect of PD by measuring and correcting for response suppression.
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Mathews & Wertheimer (1958), for instance, told their subjects
that one of eight words would be presented tachistoscopically
each time.

However, two of the four emotional words and two

of the four neutral words were never shown.

It was hypothe

sized that in the absence of any response suppression equal
numbers of the neutral and emotional words in the neverpresented group would be called.

A pure measure of response

suppression in the form of a Z score was determined by com
paring the absent emotional words called to the absent neutral
words called.

A similar Z score for each subject was determined

for his calls of the emotional and neutral words which were
presented.
suppression.

This Z score represented both PD and response
After the Z score for response suppression was

subtracted, the resulting score represented a "pure measure
of PD" uncontaminated by response suppression.

PD was found

even after the response suppression was taken from it.
Minard (1965) reported a doctoral study in which he repli
cated and extended the research previously done by Mathews &
Wertheimer.

In this experiment the subjects were given a card

containing the eight stimulus words, but as before only four
of these words were ever presented.

In addition to this smudged

blank slides were presented instead of stimulus words through
out the trials to get pseudoaccuracy scores for each subject.
The response suppression was then determined as the difference
between the neutral responses which were guesses and the emo
tional responses which were guesses.

Guesses included responses
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to the smudged blanks and all inaccurate responses.

The PD

was then determined as the differences between neutral responses
which were accurate and the emotional responses which were
accurate.

Minard found the response suppression to be insig

nificant and the PD to be significant even after the response
suppression was accounted for,
Sarbin & Chun (1967), recognizing the improvement in
Minard's changes of Mathews & Wertheimer's method of eliminating
the effects of response suppression, suggested that the Z score
for response bias be determined from all the incorrect responses
rather than just the incorrect responses from the never presented
stimuli.

In addition to this they allowed the subjects to

respond with a number rather than with the emotional or peutral
word which was presented to them tachistoscopically.

When

these changes were incorporated into their study, Sarbin &
Chun found no significant PD effect.

This, they concluded,

was due to the fact that the subjects' responses were numbers
representing their answers rather than the neutral or emotional
responses themselves.
Another approach to controlling response suppression has
been to eliminate it by using a forced choice technique in
which the alternatives for any particular choice have been
all emotional or all neutral.

Bootzin & Natsoulas (1965)

presented to their subjects neutral and emotional words at
.01 and .03 seconds as well as hash marks at .01 seconds.
Following the presentations of each word or set of hash marks,

24
the subject was given a choice between two words equal in
emotionality, familiarity, and length.

There were two blocks

of stimulus presentations, each block being comprised of two
presentations of each of the eight words at each duration plus
presentations of the hash marks for each of the response pos
sibilities, making a total of 96 presentations.

At the ,03-

second exposures on the first block there were significant
differences between the recognition thresholds for emotional
and neutral words, but this was not true at the .01-second
exposures.

This suggests that there was PD uncontaminated

by response suppression at the .03-second exposure level but
not at the .01-second exposure level.

At the .01 level the

responses to the words as well as those to the hash marks
did not differ from chance.

From block 1 to block 2 there

was a significant improvement in accuracy for emotional words
at the .03 level but not for the neutral words.

This suggests

that one habituates to the emotionality of the words over
trials and that with more trials the PD will disappear entirely.
This is a significant finding that is supported by other re
search (Bootzin & Stephens, 1967; Brown, 1961; Goldstein, 1966;
Natsoulas, 1965; Zajonc, 1962).
From these studies one can see that there have been a
number of attempts to eliminate the response inhibition expla
nation for the PD phenomenon: manipulating the type of response
that is required (Goldstein et al,, 1962; Loiselle, 1966;
Loiselle & Williamson,

1966; Nothman, 1962; Taylor et al.,
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1961; Zajonc, 1962), forced choice from responses of equal
emotionality (Bootzin & Natsoulas, 1965; Bootzin & Stephens,
1967), and measuring the degree of response suppression and
subtracting it from perceptual tendencies (Goldstein, 1962,
1964, 1966; Mathews & Wertheimer,

1958; Minard, 1965; Minard

et al., 1965; Minard & Mooney, 1969; Sarbin & Chun, 1967).

Control of the Stimulus Effect;
In spite of the apparent success that some of these exper
imenters have had in controlling or eliminating response biases,
few of them have even considered the possibility that the tend
ency to inhibit an emotional response might be instigated by
the perception of the stimulus.

This is to suggest that response

bias might occur only when it is activated.

This does not deny

the fact that response suppression exists as it is usually
thought of— the simple tendency to avoid giving a taboo or
emotional response-.

However, it is suggested here that response

suppression might be greater or less depending upon the nature
of the stimulus; and in the absence of any method of measuring
this "stimulus effect" (Natsoulas,

1965), it is possible that

the results of a perceptual study would be interpreted as
demonstrating PD when they actually represent differential
response tendencies based upon the emotionality associated
with the stimuli.
The relevance of this stimulus effect to PD studies was
first introduced by Blum (1955) when he tested and supported
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the hypothesis:
subjects predisposed to use the mechanism of repression
in conjunction with a given conflict will, when confronted
subliminally with a conflict-relevant stimulus, show
defensive behavior directly traceable to the perceptual
process itself (p.25).
In this study Blum presented quadrads of Blacky Pictures to
graduate students in Psychology at a subliminal level of stim
ulation and instructed the subjects to identify the picture
in each area of the quadrad.

The emotionality or degree of

conflict associated with each picture for each subject was
determined by a number of tests as was the degree to which
one exhibited repression on each dimension represented by the
Blacky Pictures.

Out of the 11 possible pictures, however,

the same four were always presented— two neutral and two emo
tional (the emotional pictures being those that had a signi
ficant amount of conflict associated with them as well as the
defense mechanism of repression to avoid them).

Consequently

there were two categories of responses: those that were always
presented and those that were never presented.

Blum found

that for the pictures which were presented there were fewer
calls of emotional pictures than neutral pictures: 9.42 to
17.12 with 17.46 being the calls which would be expected for
any one picture according to chance.

This difference was

significant at the .001 level of confidence, but for the absent
pictures there were no significant differences:

15.20 to 16.69.

This indicated that the emotionality of the stimulus did dif
ferentially affect the responses:
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An avoidance response to a subliminal stimulus has taken
place. Apparently the subject makes an unconscious visual
discrimination which somehow cues off an avoidance re
action. The threatening stimulus must actually be pro
vided by the environment in order for this defensive
response to be instigated. With respect to antecedent
conditions, we now know that it takes a combination of
conflict in an area plus a predisposition to repress that
conflict to produce the avoidance.
Conflict alone has
no discernible effect (Blum, 1955, pp.27-28).
In a very similar study Blum (1957) demonstrated that
subjects who preferred the avoidance alternative for a Blacky
Picture on the DPI (Defense Preference Inquiry for Blacky
Pictures) reported perception of that picture less frequently
when it was one of the discriminable stimuli than when it was
a possible response that had not been used in the stimulus.
Blum pointed out that this effect was significant for a low
accuracy group of subjects but not for a high accuracy group thus providing evidence for the differential effects of person
ality characteristics on perception.

Explanation of this

phenomenon in terms of selective verbal report (response sup
pression) is again ruled out by the lack of a significant
difference in the absent picture condition.

If it were verbal

suppression, pictures associated with avoidance defenses would
be undercalled even in the absent condition.
In these two studies Blum has demonstrated that stimuli
representing some psychosexual conflict for the subject can
trigger a defensive reaction in certain (repressive) subjects
that leads to response suppression for those stimuli.

The

implications of this finding for a more thorough understanding
of the PD phenomenon are indicated by the following statement:

When we recall that PD is not confined to strictly libid
inous stimuli such as Blum used, it is tempting to specu
late on the generality of Blum's vigilance effect with
other types of emotional stimuli; more experimental work
is required on this point (Rrown, 1961, p.68).
In spite of this suggestion by Brown and a similar plea
by Natsoulas (1965), the present writer finds that very little
attempt has been made in PD research to pursue the stimuluseffect findings of Blum.

Examples of attempts to control or

reduce response inhibition were discussed earlier, but most
of these researchers have ignored the possibility that differ
ences in recognition thresholds between ES and NS could be due
to the stimulus effect--an inhibitory response activated by
the perception of the stimulus,
Blum's research tends to indicate that partial perception
of ES activates some defensive mechanism which may act in the
same way as response suppression.

His results were not ana

lyzed in terms of the specific responses that were elicited
by the ES and NS.

In fact, the only matter of concern was

whether or not subjects were responding differently to them,
but the results suggest that the way one responds to stimuli
is affected by the amount of emotionality associated with them

PROBLEM
The purpose of this study was to propose a method of
evaluating the stimulus-effect hypothesis as well as an effect
ive way of measuring PD at different levels of stimulation.
While most researchers in the past have been satisfied with
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one general measure of response suppression and have ignored
the possible effect that stimuli may have on response tenden
cies, there was in this study a breakdown of "response sup
pression" into two parts: the tendency to suppress emotional
responses when the stimulus is emotional and the tendency to
suppress emotional responses when the stimulus is neutral.
The former tendency will hereafter be referred to as Ert
(response tendency following E S ) ; and the latter tendency will
be referred to as Nrt (response tendency following NS).

Any

significant differences between the two tendencies as they
are here defined would tend to support or refute the stimuluseffect hypothesis: that partial perception of ES activates an
avoidance reaction which reduces emotional responses.

PD will

be defined as the elevation of recognition thresholds for ES
when compared with the recognition thresholds for NS.

Notice

that nothing is said in this definition about response tend
encies.

This is an essential point, for PD is defined as a

perceptual phenomenon which is not affected by response tend
encies,

The percentage of correct responses will be affected

by Ert, Nrt, and PD; but once the effects of response tenden
cies are accounted for, any remaining differences between
correct calls to ES and correct calls to NS will be a function
solely of PD.

HYPOTHESES
1)

Stimulus-effect hypothesis:

that across all levels of
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stimulation the tendency to inhibit emotional responses will
be greater when ES are presented than when NS are presented.
2)

Perceptual Defense hypothesis:

that across all levels of

stimulation the tendency to recognize NS correctly will be
greater than the tendency to recognize ES correctly, and that
this tendency will be greater for "repressors" than,; for "intellectualizers".

This hypothesized difference between repressors

and intellectualizers has been supported by the general finding
that repressors tend to avoid contact with emotional material
more than do intellectualizers and thus have higher recognition
thresholds for ES (Blum, 1955, 1957; Bootzin & Natsoulas, 1965;
Brown, 1961; Carlson, 1954; Lazarus et al., 1951; Mathews &
Wertheimer,

1958).

METHOD
Subjects:
Forty female undergraduates volunteered to participate
in this experiment to fulfill their experimental requirements
for an introductory course in psychology which was given during
the spring quarter, 1969, at the University of Montana.

A

few of the subjects had participated in other experiments,
but the majority of them were freshmen who were naive about
psychological experiments.
Apparatus:
A Hunter GSR amplifier was used to indicate the physio
logical responses to words which were presented in a Polymetric
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Model #V0959T tachistoscope. The same tachistoscope was also
used in the perceptual task.

In a brief pilot study preceeding

this study it was determined that single words were easily
recognized at the shortest exposure time (.01 seconds) when
no attempt was made to obscure them.

Therefore, the target

which each subject was instructed to focus upon prior to the
presentation of the stimulus word was changed so that a series
of X's covered the spot upon which the word would be presented
instead of a single X to indicate the center of the stimulus
word.

This increased the difficulty of the perceptual task

to such a degree that most subjects were responding within
the limits of chance accuracy at the .01-second exposure time
while they were responding with better than 70% accuracy at
the .03-second exposure time.
Procedure:
The study was conducted in three parts over an eight week
period.

The first part was designed to select emotional and

neutral words which were matched for length and familiarity;
the second part to present these words tachistoscopically to
determine the amount of PD, Ert, and Nrt that occurred; and
the third part to administer Byrne's "Health and Opinion Survey"
(Byrne, Barry, & Nelson, 1963) to differentiate intellectual
izers and repressors.
During the first part of the study each subject was seen
individually and introduced to the study with the following
statement:
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Before we go ahead with this study I want to tell you
a little bit about it so you can decide whether or not
you want to participate in it.
If you decide not to
participate in the study, you can leave right now and
get one hour of credit for coming here today. Then you
can make up the other hours later on in the quarter.
If you decide to go ahead with the study, we'11 go ahead
with this hour and then make appointments for the other
hours later on.
This is a study in perception, and I have a group of
words that you will have to see and in somp cases say.
Now, the only thing that might be somewhat objectionable
to you is that some of these words are what you might
call socially unacceptable or taboo words, and the
situation could be somewhat embarrassing for you.
I've
explained this to the other subjects, and no one has
seemed to mind that much; but if you'd rather not parti
cipate in the study because of this, then you're certainly
free to say so now.
If you want to go ahead with the
study, then you can say so and I'll go ahead and explain
the rest of it to you.
None of the subjects chose to drop out of the study,
and as each agreed to continue, she was told how to sort the
words with respect to familiarity.

This procedure was similar

to the one used by Bryant et al. (1967) who found that sub
jective evaluation was a more effective way of controlling
stimulus familiarity in PD studies than the more common pro
cedure of selecting words with matched frequencies in Thorn
dike and Lorge's list of 30,000 words (Thorndike & Lorge, 1944).
Each subject was given the following instructions:
Here I have 30 cards, and there is a word typed on each
card.
I want you to look over all 30 words and then sort
them into 5 piles from the most familiar word to the least
familiar word. Now, familiarity is to be determined by
how often or how many times you've seen the word, heard
the word, or read the word. And when you're sorting the
words into the 5 piles, I want you to try not to think
in terms of meaning, of value, of how pleasant or unpleas
ant the words are, or of anything except familiarity.
And remember...by familiarity I mean how often you've
seen the word, heard the word, or read the word, OK...
Are there any questions?
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As soon as the subject finished this task, she was handed the
first pile which she had just sorted (the most familiar words)
and told:
Now I want you to sort the words in this pile with the
most familiar word on the bottom up to the least familiar
word on the top.
When this was done the experimenter picked up this pile, took
off the top three cards and put them on the next pile, and
asked the subject to sort that pile in the same way - with the
most familiar word on the bottom up to the least familiar word
on the top.

When the 5 piles had been sorted in this way and

collected by the experimenter, the 30 cards were given back
to the subject in the order of her judged familiarity.

She

was then told to look through the words to be sure that they
were in the right order and to change the order of any of them
if she wanted to.
The words to be sorted were 30 five-letter nouns and 30
six-letter nouns, each of which was typed at the top of a plain
3 X 5

card.

Ten of the words in each group of 30 were selected

by the experimenter because they were considered to be 'dirty'
words and words that would generally elicit embarrassment when
spoken in mixed company.

The other 20 words in each group

differed widely with respect to familiarity as indicated by
the Thorndike-Lorge word book.

As soon as a subject was satis

fied that the words in the first group were in the right order,
she was given the second group to sort in the same way.

The

order of each group of words was then recorded as the subject
filled out the questionnaire in Table 1 on page 34.
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Table 1
(Questionnaire for evaluating stimulus emotionality)
Imagine that you are to discuss with me each of the words in
the following list. Rate each word in terms of the feelings
that you think you would have while using and discussing it
according to the following criteria:
1 ^ relaxed

2 = uneasy

3 = disturbed

4 = very disturbed

This report wilf be kept confidential, and you will not be
asked to explain any of your responses. Try to be as honest
in this evaluation of these words as you can.
KIDNEY

LEGEND

RHYME

CHURCH

NUMBER

ATTIC

HYMENS

VIRGIN

ALPHA

JACKET

PELVIS

QUEER

BREAST

RASCAL

KOTEX

HEAVEN

ERASER

VALVE

BEAGLE

ARTIST

TURDS

TAMPAX

RECTUM

IDIOM

CORNER

MANTEL

SHITS

IMPACT

AMBUSH

FIELD

FUCKER

SCARF

BITCH

MAIDEN

LOVER

KNIFE

TAILOR

MAGIC

IMAGE

GALAXY

LATCH

PENIS

WHORE

PENNY

SHRINE

BELLY

! JEWEL

DENIAL

GLAZE

LEASE

RAPIST

HAREM

ONION

VAGINA

FARTS

SPERM

PENCIL

DEPOT

ELBOW

(

FLAVOR

\

There were no formal instructions during the rest of the
experiment, but an attempt was made to impart to each subject
the same information and expectations.

Upon the completion

of the questionnaire each subject was connected to a GSR am
plifier and told that these words would be presented to her
individually for a duration of about two seconds in the tach
istoscope at 15 second intervals.

She was asked to look at

each word while it was being presented and to say it as soon
as it disappeared from the screen.

She was then told that it

was understandable that she might not want to say some of the
words, and in such cases she might remain silent.

However,

she was encouraged to say each word, as it "would be better
for the study."
Each group of 30 words was presented in random order
twice to each subject, and the maximum GSR in the 5-second
period following the presentation of each word was recorded
as the subject's response to that word.

The 6-letter words

were presented first followed by the 5-letter words, and then
the 6-letter words were presented again followed by the 5letter words.

Following the presentation of each group of

words there was a short rest period during which the subject
was encouraged to get more comfortable, take a deep breath,
etc.

Immediately before the presentation of each group the

subject was asked to remain as still as possible, as any move
ment would cause readings on the amplifier that could contam
inate the data.

In the analysis of these data for the selection of ES
the GSRs elicited by each word in blocks of 10 words were
considered first.

The 5 words with the highest GSRs in each

block were marked as 'potentially emotional1 words, and the
only words which were considered in the final analysis were
those which were ranked 'potentially emotional' both times
that they were presented.

These words were then listed and

scored with respect to the subject's rating of each word on
the questionnaire.

From these words the 8 words with the

highest subjective ratings were selected as the ES.
with a rating of 1 was selected as an emotional word.

No word
In 5

cases, however, subjects gave less than 8 of the words ratings
higher than 1; and in these cases the subject was given back
the questionnaire and asked to differentiate somewhat more
between the words.
The neutral words consisted of those 1) that were ranked
as not 'potentially emotional' at least one of the two times
that they were presented, and 2) that were given a rating of
1 on the questionnaire.

Since pairs of emotional and neutral

words matched with respect to familiarity were needed in this
i

study, the neutral word which was closest to an emotional word
on the familiarity scale was selected as the 'mate' of that
emotional word provided that the words were not separated by
more than 3 words on the scale.

If there were no neutral words

close enough to an emotional word for this kind of pairing,
that word was not selected as an ES for the second phase of
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the study.

Eight pairs of words were selected for a subject

whenever possible.

In a number of cases this many pairs was

not available; and when it was not possible to get at least
6 pairs of words, that subject was eliminated from the study.
In order to get 40 subjects, 59 subjects were put through this
first phase of the experiment.

Nineteen of these subjects

were disqualified due to the fact that it was not possible
to get at least 6 pairs of words by the criteria discussed
above.
The second part of the experiment was conducted from one
to six weeks after the first part following the selection of
4 groups of 4 words (2 neutral and 2 emotional words) which
were matched with respect to length and familiarity as deter
mined by the procedures of the first part of the experiment.
(For those cases in which only 6 or 7 pairs

of words could be

used, one or 2 of the

in order to have

pairs were used twice

4 groups with 4 words in each group.)

These words were pre

sented tachistoscopically one at a time with instructions to
select each of her responses from a list of 4 possible responses
that were presented immediately following the presentation of
the test word.

To minimize the effects of response bias a

procedure similar to the one employed by Sarbin & Chun (4967)
was used, in which the subjects were instructed not to say the
word which they chose

as their response but to say the number

beside the word.

4 possible responses were the groups

The

selected during the first part of the experiment.

They were
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made up of the stimulus word, a word of similar emotional
content, and 2 matched words from the opposite emotionality
category, ie. 2 emotional and 2 neutral words.
At any one exposure level a subject had to make 80 dis
criminations, for each word in each of the 4 groups was pre
sented randomly 5 times.

There were 3 exposure times:

.01,

.02, and .03 seconds; and the order in which these exposures
were used was manipulated so that all possible combinations
were used.
In the third part of the experiment each subject was
given Byrne’s " H e alth and Opinion Survey1' (Byrne, et al.,
1963) to differentiate repressors and sensitizers.

Normative

data were based primarily upon a sample similar to the one
used in this study; and as the reported mean for females was
42.68, those who scored lower than 42.68 were classified as
repressors while those with higher scores were classified as
sensitizers.

By this criterion 13 of the 40 subjects were

classified as repressors, and 27 were classified as sensitizers.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The data for each individual were summarized in tables
similar to the one below to indicate the frequency and type
of responses at each exposure time for each of the two types
of stimuli.
STIMULUS
correct
RESPONSE
correct
incorrect
incorrect

emotional
neutral
emotional
neutral

emotional neutral
________ *
..............
___________
'
_________________
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Computations were made on the raw data to determine the
amounts of Nrt and Ert that occurred.

This provided the in

formation necessary for testing the first hypothesis.

It also

made it possible to adjust the correct responses to NS and ES
to account for and eliminate the effects of Nrt and Ert.

This

then provided the information necessary for testing the second
hypothesis.
As an example of how this procedure worked, consider an
hypothetical situation in which the recognition of neutral
words is 30% above chance while the recognition of emotional
words is only 10% above chance.

This is the sort of situation

which would exist if PD occurs.

Suppose also that response

tendencies are such that emotional responses to NS are sup
pressed 14% of the time (Nrt) while emotional responses to
ES are suppressed 23% of the time (Ert),
To facilitate understanding of how this hypothetical
example is derived, consider the following steps:
Suppose that 40 neutral and 40 emotional words were presented
individually and that following the presentations the subject
responded by calling one of four possible words (as described
earlier in the design of this study).

In the absence of any

perceptual effect or any response effect, the subject would
respond randomly as indicated in the table below:
STIMULUS
correct
RESPONSE
correct
incorrect
incorrect

emotional
neutral
emotional
neutral

emotional
10
0
lb
20

neutral
0
10
20
10
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If PD occurred so that the recognition of neutral words was
30% above chance while the recognition of emotional words was
only 10% above chance, the following results would occur:
STIMULUS
correct
RESPONSE
correct
incorrect
incorrect

emotional
neutral
emotional
neutral

emotional
(a) 13
0
(b) ' 9
(c) 18

neutral
0
(A) 19
(B) 14
7
cc;

If in addition to this there was Nrt of 14% and Ert of 23%
the following results would occur:
STIMULUS
correct
RESPONSE
correct
incorrect
incorrect

emotional
neutral
emotional
neutral

emotional
10
0
7
23

neutral
0
20
12
8

This represents the raw data which would result if the recog
nition of neutral words were 30% above chance, if the recog
nition of emotional words were 10% above chance, if Nrt amounted
to 14%, and if Ert amounted to 23%.

These facts, of course,

are what we need to determine by the analysis of these raw data.
To do this assume the following equalities:
For responses to neutral stimuli
A = correct neutral responses in the absence of Nrt
B = incorrect emotional responses in the absence of Nrt
C = incorrect neutral responses in the absence of Nrt
x = Nrt
xB = emotional responses suppressed
For responses to emotional stimuli
a = correct emotional responses in the absence of Ert
b = incorrect emotional responses in the absence of Ert
c = incorrect neutral responses in the absence of Ert
y = Ert
ya+yb = emotional responses suppressed

41
Given:
A
a

+B + C = 40
+b t c = 40
B = 2C
c = 2b
ya_______ yb
a - ya ' b - yb

Determination of Nrt

Determination of Ert

A = 20 - xfi/2
B = 12 + xB
8 - xB/2
c

10 + ya
a
b
7 + yb
c = 23
ya - yb
=

=

-

=

40 = A
B + C
B = 40
A
C
B - 40
20
xB/2
B
12 + xB
2C
B
B
16
xB
B
12
xB
2B
28
B
14
B
12
xB
14
12
xB
xB
2
xl4
2
X
= .14
20
xB/2
A
A
20
1
A = 19
+

-

=

-

-

+

-

8

=
=
=

-

=

+

=

*

=?

+

=

+

=

=*

=

-

=

-

40 = a + b + c
40
10 + ya + 7 + yb + 14 + 2yb
xB/2 9
ya
3yb

+

=

i&

+

ik

10
7
1.4 yb
ya
9
1.4 yb
3yb
9
4.4 yb
2
yt>
b
7
2
b zz 9
2
y9
.22
y
a
10
ya
1.4
yb
ya
ya = ;2.8 (3 rounded)
a
10+3
13
a
r—

+

.-«T
=

=

=

+

=

=

=

+

=

=
-

These computations have indicated that for this one subject
at this one exposure level Ert is greater than Nrt.

To test

the stimulus-effect hypothesis in the present study these
two tendencies were compared for each subject at each exposure
time; and when Ert was greater than Nrt, the subject was given
a score of +1.

When Nrt was greater than E r t , the subject

was given a score of -1.

Occasionally Ert and Nrt were equal.

In order to include such cases in the analysis without dis
torting the size of the sample, the subject was given a score
of

+V2 and -46 at that exposure time when these two tendencies
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were equal.

Hypothesis 1 was then tested at each exposure

time by the Chi square test of goodness of fit - the null
hypothesis predicting that there will be the same number of
minus scores as plus scores.

The hypothesis was also tested

over the combined frequencies in the same way except that a
subject was given a +1 score when the Ert was greater than
Nrt on at least 2 out of the 3 exposure times and a -1 when
the tendency was just the opposite.

Again, when the tendencies

were equal, the subject received a score of +36 and -36.

The

results are tabulated below in Table 2.
The perceptual defense hypothesis was tested in a similar
way for all 40 subjects, as well as for the repressors as one
group and the sensitizers as another group.

At each exposure

time a subject was given a +1 score when the number of correct
responses to neutral stimuli after the correction for Nrt
(value identified in the example as A) was greater than the
number of correct responses to emotional stimuli after the
correction for Ert (value identified in the example as a).
When these correct neutral responses were less than the correct
emotional responses, the subject was given a -1 for that ex
posure time; and if the responses were equal in number, the
subject received a score of +36 and -36.
ulated below in Table 3.
\

The results are tab
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Table 2
(Chi Square Analysis of Hypothesis 1)
Exposure time
.03
.02
.01
combined

Ert - Nrt
-13
-8
-8
-12

X2
4.25*
1.60
1.60
3*60

*p< .05

Table 3
(Chi Square Analysis of Hypothesis 2)
Exposure
time

13 Repressors
9
CN - CE
JT

.03
.02
.01
combined

-6
-3
3
-4

2.77
<1
<1
1.23

27 Sensitizers

0
CN - CE
-6
-1
-6
-6

JT
1.34
<1
1.34
1.34

Repressors Sensitizers
X2
<1
<1
1.03
<1

It is apparent from these results that neither hypothesis
was confirmed.

The only difference which was significant at

the .05 level of significance occurred in the test of the first
hypothesis at the .03-second exposure time, and this difference
was in the opposite direction to that predicted.

DISCUSSION
Both of the hypotheses implied that a subject's behavior
is affected by some aspect of ES which is perceived below the
level of awareness*

The first hypothesis predicted that partial

perception of ES would result in an increased tendency to in
hibit emotional responses, and the second hypothesis predicted
that partial perception of the same ES would result in elevated

recognition thresholds for these stimuli.

The failure to

confirm either of the hypotheses leaves unsupported the con
tention that subjects are affected by the emotionality assoc
iated with stimuli whfch are presented subliminally.

The

significant difference between Ert and Nrt at the .03-second
exposure did not support the stimulus effect hypothesis, but
it suggests the possibility that there might be a more complex
relationship between response tendency and stimulus emotion
ality than hypothesized.

Further research is needed to de

termine this.
As discussed earlier a number of researchers have accounted
for PD in terms of response suppression, a generalized tendency
to inhibit certain responses and to prefer others.

Such a

tendency is relevant to PD studies, so that most researchers
who support the PD phenomenon have attempted to eliminate or
account for response tendencies in their analysis of the re
lationship between perception and stimulus emotionality.

In

the present study a t_ test, carried out on the raw data, showed
that there were significantly more correct neutral responses
than correct emotional responses; and when response tendencies
were measured by a Chi Square analysis of the deviation from
randomness in the incorrect responses to ES and N S , it was
found that there was a significant tendency to suppress emo
tional responses.

The failure to find significant differences

between correct neutral and correct emotional responses after
correcting for response tendencies (Table 3, p.43) suggests
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that the data in the present study can be adequately accounted
for by a response bias explanationIn the present study there were a number of relatively
new approaches to measuring different variables.

Familiarity,

for instance, was determined by a ranking technique rather
than by selection of words from the Thorndike-Lorge word book.
Research tends to indicate that ranking is the more effective
procedure, as it takes into consideration each individual’s
experience with words rather than assuming that all subjects
are equally familiar with them.

More research is needed,

however, to develop a set of instructions and procedures that
gives all of the subjects the same mental set regarding the
task.
The measurement of emotionality by GSRs and subjective
evaluation is also a new approach in PD studies.

Common

approaches in the past have been to.select stimulus words by
a word association test or to pair words with aversive stimuli
to make them emotional.

Such different procedures, however,

may result in the utilization of ES that differ with respect
to the 'kind of emotionality' which is associated with them.
This, in turn, could result in conflicting findings from one
study to the next; for a subject might not respond to a word
associated with fear, for instance, in the same way that he
would respond to a word associated with excitement or happiness
or failure, etc.

The formulation of a generally acceptable

definition of 'emotionality' and the development of a standard
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way of measuring it might resolve some of the conflicting
results of PD studies.
A similar matter of concern for PD studies is that ES
may lose their emotional quality with continued use.

Research

has shovm that subjects tend to habituate to the emotionality
of words over trials and that with more trials PD tends to
disappear (Bootzin & Natsoulas, 1965; Bootzin & Stephens,
1967; Brown, 1961; Goldstein, 1966; Natsoulas,
1962).

1965; Zajonc,

In the present study no PD was found, but this was

after the subjects had sorted the words with respect to fam
iliarity, scored them on the emotionality questionnaire, and
responded to them in the tachistoscope.

It is possible that

the ES were no longer emotional by the time they were presented
in the second phase of the experiment.

An improvement in the

present study might therefore have been the use of a second
measurement of emotionality after the tachistoscopic present
ation of the stimuli.
Another new aspect of the present study was the model
utilized in the analysis of the data.

As indicated in the

example on pages 39 & 40 it was assumed in this model that
Nrt would reduce the incorrect emotional responses by a certain
amount and increase both the correct and incorrect neutral
responses by equal parts of that amount.

It was also assumed

that Ert would reduce correct and incorrect emotional responses
by proportionate amounts and increase the incorrect neutral
responses by that amount.

These are logical assumptions that
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provide the means by which qne can measure and compare the
variables in question.

However, it is nonetheless true that

they are assumptions, the core of an hypothetical model, and
as such they are based on logic rather than fact.

An extension

of the present research by utilizing different statistical
models might lead to a more thorough understanding of the
PD phenomenon#

One might well question, for instance, the

additive relationship which is typically assumed to exist
between perceptual tendencies and response tendencies.

If,

in fact, these tendencies are not additive in their effect
upon behavior, current approaches to analyzing perceptual
data could be overcorrecting or undercorrecting for response
bias.
In the present study neither hypothesis was confirmed.
The presentation of ES was not found to disrupt perception
nor to increase a subject's tendency to suppress emotional
responses.

As pointed out in the introduction, past PD studies

have failed to control adequately all of the confounding var
iables that affect subject1s behavior.

It is therefore likely

that when the present controls are employed to select ES and
NS and to eliminate the confounding effects of familiarity
and response tendencies, neither PD nor the stimulus effect
will be found.

Better controls, the utilization of different

types of ES, and continued research into the relationship
between perceptual tendencies and response tendencies might
resolve some of the conflicting findings in PD research.
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SUMMARY
A perceptual defense study was conducted in which recog
nition thresholds for taboo and neutral words were determined
while controlling for familiarity and response bias.
hypothesized:

It was

l) that the tendency to inhibit emotional re

sponses would be greater when the stimulus was emotional than
when it was neutral, and 2) that perceptual defense would
occur across all subjects but to a greater degree for repressors
than for sensitizers.
The experiment was conducted in three parts:

1) selection

of the stimuli for each subject individually, 2) tachistoscopic
presentation of the words, 3) group administration of a person
ality inventory.

Neither hypothesis was supported.

There

were significantly more correct neutral responses than correct
emotional responses across all of the subjects; but when re
sponse tendencies were accounted for, there was no significant
difference in the perception of neutral and emotional words
either within or between the two groups of subjects.

There

was a significant difference between the response tendencies
following emotional and neutral stimuli at the .03-second
exposure time, but this difference was in the opposite direction
to that predicted.

This leaves open the question of whether

or not there is some relationship between stimulus emotionality
and response bias.
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